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Abstract
Background: Since late 2003, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks caused by infection with H5N1 virus has
led to the deaths of millions of poultry and more than 10 thousands of wild birds, and as of 18-March 2008, at least 373
laboratory-confirmed human infections with 236 fatalities, have occurred. The unrestrained worldwide spread of this disease
has caused great anxiety about the potential of another global pandemic. However, the effect of environmental factors
influencing the spread of HPAI H5N1 virus is unclear.
Methodology/Principal Findings: A database including incident dates and locations was developed for 128 confirmed HPAI
H5N1 outbreaks in poultry and wild birds, as well as 21 human cases in mainland China during 2004–2006. These data,
together with information on wild bird migration, poultry densities, and environmental variables (water bodies, wetlands,
transportation routes, main cities, precipitation and elevation), were integrated into a Geographical Information System
(GIS). A case-control design was used to identify the environmental factors associated with the incidence of the disease.
Multivariate logistic regression analysis indicated that minimal distance to the nearest national highway, annual
precipitation and the interaction between minimal distance to the nearest lake and wetland, were important predictive
environmental variables for the risk of HPAI. A risk map was constructed based on these factors.
Conclusions/Significance: Our study indicates that environmental factors contribute to the spread of the disease. The risk
map can be used to target countermeasures to stop further spread of the HPAI H5N1 at its source.
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Introduction
The H5N1 subtype of the influenza A virus was initially
detected in poultry on a farm of Scotland, UK, in 1959 [1]. The
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus reappeared in
1997 and caused an outbreak in chicken farms and live bird
markets in Hong Kong, where 18 human cases were reported with
6 deaths [2]. The recent chain of outbreaks caused by H5N1
started among poultry in South Korea in December 2003, and has
affected 61 countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe
leading to the deaths of millions of poultry and more than 10
thousands of wild birds [3,4]. Even worse, the HPAI H5N1 virus
appears to have gained ability to cross the species barrier and
induce severe disease and death in humans as well as other
mammals.
As of 18-March 2008, there have been 373 laboratory-
confirmed human infections, of which 236 have died [5]. The
worldwide spread of the disease is providing more opportunities
for viral re-assortment within a host (genetic shift) and mutation
over time (genetic drift). These factors may lead to a viral strain
that is more efficient at person-to-person transmission, raising the
potential for another pandemic to occur [6–9]. Since January
2004, HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in poultry and wild birds, and
occasional trans-species transmission to humans have been
reported throughout mainland China [5,10]. Surveillance
studies suggested that poultry movement and wild bird
migration may have contributed to such a quick spread
[7,11,12]. However, the processes, including environmental
factors, influencing the spread of HPAI H5N1 virus are not
clearly understood.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 May 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 5 | e2268In this study, we explore environmental factors associated with
such outbreaks in mainland China to provide essential information
for developing effective and appropriate countermeasures.
Results
Since the emergence of HPAI H5N1 infections in mainland
China in January 2004, a total of 128 outbreaks of HPAI H5N1,
spanning a large geographic area of mainland China, has occurred
in poultry and wild birds at the village/township level in 26 of 31
provinces, municipalities or autonomous regions by the end of
2006 [10]. The spatial distributions of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in
poultry and wild birds, and human cases in mainland China were
displayed in the thematic map (Figure 1). The background of the
map was the poultry density. The generalized migration routes of
birds were overlapped on the map.
In a case-control study, minimal distances to the nearest lake,
wetland, national highway and main city, as well as annual
precipitation appeared to be significantly associated factors in the
univariate analysis (Table 1). Multivariate logistic regression
demonstrated that three variables, minimal distance to the nearest
national highway, annual precipitation and the interaction
between minimal distance to the nearest lake and wetland, were
significantly associated with HPAI H5N1 outbreaks (Table 1).
Goodness of fit for the logistic regression model was evaluated
using Hosmer-Lemeshow test, showing a high risk discrimination
between outbreak sites and ‘‘control’’ areas (X
2=4.305,
P=0.829).
We have also investigated possible overestimation of effects due
to clustering of neighboring outbreaks. Within clusters, transmis-
sion of H5N1 from one location to another could have occurred
directly, instead of through the investigated environmental factors.
Using the criterion of a distance ,20 km and a time-interval
,3 weeks, we could identify 6 clusters in a total of 30 outbreaks.
We have repeated the multivariate logistic regression using only
one randomly selected outbreak site from each cluster (i.e., 104
cases and 520 controls), but this did not lead to significantly
different results. The adjusted OR and P-value for the three
factors, minimal distance to the nearest national highway, annual
precipitation and the interaction between minimal distance to the
nearest lake and wetland, were 0.825 (P=0.005), 0.915
(P=0.001), and 0.970 (P,0.001) respectively.
Based on the predictive model derived from the logistic
regression analysis, a predictive risk map of HPAI H5N1 infections
was established for mainland China by GIS technologies (Figure 2).
On the risk map, the locations of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in
poultry from January of 2007 to March 13, 2008 were also plotted
(8 outbreaks). The overlapping analysis revealed that 87.5% (7/8)
of outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 in poultry occurred in the predictive
highest or high-risk areas (Figure 2).
Discussion
The results of our case-control study demonstrate that the
interaction between minimal distance to the nearest lake and
wetland minimal distance to the nearest national highway, and the
annual average precipitation are the principal environmental
variables contributing to the spread of HPAI H5N1 virus in
mainland China. These findings indicate that bird populations in
close proximity to a body of water are in danger of becoming
infected, and provide further evidence for the role of waterfowl in
the transmission of avian influenza. HPAI is mainly characterized
by a quick spread and a high mortality rate in poultry. However,
except for some species [13], waterfowl are typically asymptomatic
reservoirs for H5N1 [14], perhaps shedding virus through their
salivary and nasal secretions and feces into bodies of water in
which they are inhabiting [11]. It is estimated that the virus can
survive in water at 22uC for up to 4 days and up to 30 days at 0uC
[15]. People may unconsciously take the virus to a body of water
from contaminated surfaces or infected birds. Birds and other
animals also may transport the virus on their feathers or fur to a
water source after coming into contact with an infected animal or
contaminated surface on a farm. The spread of the virus is
facilitated when the body of water, such as a lake, is stagnant and
adjacent to a farm or community [16]. Interestingly, as the
precipitation in a region increases, the risk of HPAI H5N1
outbreaks is reduced. One explanation for this result may be that
lower precipitation levels may lead to a higher concentration of
Figure 1. Spatial distribution of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in domestic poultry and wild birds and human cases in mainland China.
Poultry density is indicated by color gradient. Distributions of generalized migration routes of migratory birds are overlapped.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002268.g001
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of bird becoming infected through contact with the virus.
Proximity to national highway is another risk factor contributing
to HPAI infection. National highways in mainland China are
funded and constructed by the central government and are vital
connections between provinces, without collection of toll. As there
are many restrictions on railway transportation of poultry in
mainland China [17], and tolls on freeways are quite high,
national highways are usually top-priority to transport poultry and
their products throughout the country. During long-distant
transportation, a variety of birds and animals from various origins
are caged on top of each other, perhaps providing an easy way of
cross-infection of avian influenza. In addition, many open live
poultry markets are established along or near the national
Table 1. The association between H5N1 outbreaks and influential factors by logistic regression analysis.
Influencing factors (Unit) Univariate analysis Multivariate analysis
Crude OR* (95% CI) P-value Adjusted OR* (95% CI) P-value
Minimal distance to the nearest body of water (10 km)
Minimal distance to the nearest lake 0.715 (0.612,0.835) ,0.001
Minimal distance to the nearest reservoir 0.996 (0.996,1.027) 0.800
Minimal distance to the nearest river 1.029 (0.999,1.060) 0.062
Minimal distance to the nearest wetland (10 km) 0.949 (0.918,0.980) 0.001
Minimal distance to the nearest transportation routes (10 km)
Minimal distance to the nearest railway 0.998 (0.983,1.013) 0.799
Minimal distance to the nearest freeway 1.002 (0.992,1.011) 0.693
Minimal distance to the nearest national highway 0.813 (0.711,0.929) 0.002 0.842 (0.742,0.956) 0.008
Minimal distance to the nearest bird migration route (10 km) 1.008 (0.988,1.029) 0.434
Minimal distance to the nearest main city (10 km) 0.948 (0.902,0.997) 0.039
Climate
Annual precipitation (100 mm) 0.932 (0.892,0.973) 0.001 0.913 (0.873,0.954) ,0.001
Elevation (100 m) 1.004 (0.984,1.024) 0.696
Poultry density (1000/km
2) 0.997 (0.986,1.007) 0.549
Interaction between minimal distance to the nearest lake and wetland
(10 km * 10 km)
0.969 (0.955,0.983) ,0.001
*ORs of the variables involving minimal distances to the nearest water bodies, wetlands, transportation routes, bird migration routes and main cities were calculated for
a ten-kilometer difference, ORs were estimated regarding annual precipitation for a 100-millimeter difference, elevation for a 100-meter difference and poultry density
for 1000-bird difference per square kilometer.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002268.t001
Figure 2. Predictive risk map of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in birds. The predictive risk map shows increased risk of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in
poultry and wild birds by color gradient. Locations of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in poultry from January of 2007 to March 13, 2008 are also indicated (8
HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in mainland China).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002268.g002
Avian Influenza
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 May 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 5 | e2268highways, which may further increase the chance of virus
transmission. These findings suggest that trade and mechanical
movement of poultry may facilitate spread of HPAI H5N1 virus,
supporting laboratory evidence as demonstrated by Li et al. [9].
The logistic regression analysis in the study demonstrates that
the risk of HPAI H5N1 infections are not increased with the
poultry density, as is usually presumed. This may due to the fact
that poultry, especially chickens in the areas with high population
densities, are usually bred in industrialized farms with good animal
husbandry practices and properly vaccinated [18]. Although the
importance as an ecological reservoir is uncertain, migratory birds
may spread H5N1 viruses to new geographic regions. Usually
migratory birds cannot fly the full distance to their annual
migratory destination. Instead, they usually interrupt their
migration to rest and refuel [19]. Avian influenza may be spread
between wild and domestic birds when migratory birds search for
food, water and shelter. The infected wild birds can carry the
influenza virus for long distances during migration [20]. Migratory
birds are loyal to their annual migratory destinations and their
stopover points, such as water bodies, wetlands and forests [21]. As
wetlands and forests are destroyed however, due to increased
human activities, especially land utilization practices, migratory
birds may be forced to search for shelter and food in other places
such as farms. This may result in increases contact between wild
and domestic birds, thus facilitating the transmission of the virus to
domestic bird populations.
In conclusion, the analyses of the spatial distribution and
underlying environmental determinants reveal that the spread of
the HPAI H5N1 is probably taking place at two different but
interlinked patterns. Transportation of poultry and their products
along highways may contribute to the long-distant national wide
spread of the disease. Contacts with infected birds, trade and
mechanical movement of poultry may be responsible for local
transmission. The two spread patterns can exist simultaneously,
and HPAI H5N1 outbreaks can take place near national
highways, near relatively stagnant bodies of water such as lakes
and wetlands, and in particular when there is reduced rainfall. The
predictive risk map of HPAI H5N1 infections established for
mainland China on basis of the above contributing factors may be
useful for identifying the areas where surveillance, vaccination and
other preventive interventions should be targeted.
Materials and Methods
Data collection and management
The data on HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in animals were obtained
from monthly reports, the official veterinary bulletins of the
Ministry of Agriculture of China and from updates on HPAI in
animals from the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)
[3,22]. All the outbreaks were confirmed with laboratory based
virological methods and officially reported in mainland China.
We developed a database including the information on the
incident dates (rather than the dates of reporting) and locations of
outbreak in birds. The information on human cases with H5N1
infection in mainland China was also included in the database.
Each of the HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in birds, as well as human
infections, were geo-coded at the village/township level and linked
to a digital map at the scale of 1:100,000 using geographical
information system (GIS) technologies. Point-type information
(single pair coordinates) was created for each outbreak site, while
line-type information was generated for migration routes of
migratory birds, based on detailed bird banding records from
mainland China [23]. Polygon-type information for water bodies
were derived from digital maps. The three-type information was
overlapped for analyses in our study. Water bodies included lakes
with a surface AREA $1.0 km
2, reservoirs having a surface area
$1.0 km
2 and both were used as polygon-type map layers. In
addition, information on transportation, main cities and elevation
were directly obtained from digital maps (provided by the
coauther Dr. Peng Gong from State Key Laboratory of Remote
Sensing Science). According to the definition suggested by U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service [24,25], wetlands stated in the current
study only included swamps, water meadows, wading lakes with a
surface $1.0 km
2, and excluded rivers, reservoirs and deep lakes.
The data on wetlands were obtained from the National
Geographical Resourse Center, which were derived from wetland
census data collected in mainland China. These data were
digitized as point-type information.
Transportation including railways, freeways and national
highways were used as line-type information. Main cities included
31 provincial capitals and 305 prefecture-level cities in mainland
China and were used as point-type information. The layer of
elevation was used as line-type information and was preprocessed
to convert it to a raster-type layer for this study. The raster-type
map layer of precipitation extrapolated by the kriging technique
using 700 weather stations in mainland China was collected from
the Institute of Geographical Sciences and Natural Resources
Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Poultry density infor-
mation was obtained from the FAO [26], which was a raster-type
layer and was as the predicted poultry density, corrected for
unsuitability and adjusted to match observed totals.
GIS spatial analysis
The spatial distribution of outbreaks in birds and human cases
was studied through overlapping analysis. A thematic map was
established on which the poultry density was taken as the
background. To understand the role of bird migration in the
spread of H5N1 virus, map layer of bird migration was created
and overlapped on the map of spatial distribution of outbreaks in
birds and human cases.
Analysis of environmental factors associated with H5N1
outbreaks
A case-control study design was used to clarify the environ-
mental factors associated with the spread of HPAI H5N1. The 128
outbreak sites were taken as ‘‘cases’’. All other villages and
townships in mainland China except for those affected by HPAI
H5N1 outbreaks from 2004 to 2006, were defined as non-
epidemic areas. Then 640 ‘‘control’’ sites (5 controls/case) were
randomly selected from the non-epizootic areas in mainland
China and then were geo-coded (see Figure 3 for the location of
cases and controls). Eight environmental factors (bodies of water,
wetlands, transportation routes, migration routes, main cities,
precipitation, elevation and poultry density) involving twelve
variables were considered in the study. The minimum distances to
the nearest bodies of water including lakes, reservoirs and rivers, as
the polygon-type information, were measured using a proximity
function of spatial analysis in such an algorithm that the minimal
distance from each case and control site to its nearest water body
edge was calculated. The minimal distance from each ‘‘case/
control’’ site to its nearest points or lines was calculated, using
point-type or line-type information (i.e., wetlands, transportation
routes including railways, freeways and national highways,
migration routes and main cities). Furthermore, using a zonal
statistical calculation technique, an 8 km mean buffer zone (the
outbreak area of 3 km plus risk area of 5 km around the outbreak
site) was calculated for the variables, annual precipitation,
Avian Influenza
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case and control site.
Statistical analyses were performed using the Statistical Package
for Social Sciences (SPSS Inc, Chicago, IL, USA). Unconditional
logistic regression was performed, and odds ratios (ORs), their
95% confidence intervals (CIs) and P-values were estimated using
maximum likelihood methods. ORs of the variables involving
minimal distances to the nearest body of water, wetlands,
transportation routes, bird migration routes and main cities were
calculated for a ten-kilometer difference. However, for annual
precipitation for a 100-millimeter difference, elevation for a 100-
meter difference and poultry density for 1000-bird difference per
square kilometer, ORs were estimated respectively. Univariate
analyses were conducted to examine the effect of each variable
separately. Quadratic and logarithmic transformations of each
variable were also tested, but these did not perform significantly
better than a linear association for any of the variables.
Multivariate analysis was then performed using the variables with
P-value of ,0.1 from the univariate analyses as covariates. The
possible interactions between each covariate were also included in
the multivariate analysis. The colinearity between covariate in the
case control study was quantitatively assessed. Correlations
between minimal distances to the nearest lake, minimal distance
to the nearest wetland and minimal distance to the nearest river
were identified. Models were also optimized by comparing the 22
log likelihood and Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit when
correlated variables were added or removed. It was discovered
that more accurate models could be derived by removing the
variable of minimal distance to the nearest river. A P-value ,0.05
was considered statistically significant by using backward-LR
method. Goodness of fit for the logistic regression model was
evaluated by using the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test.
To predict the risks of HPAI H5N1 occurrence, a grid map was
created using GIS techniques. The values of the above predictive
variables were determined for each grid with an area of 100 km
2
(10610 km) based on the predictive model derived from the
multivariate logistic regression analysis. By interlinking all the
grids, a predictive risk map of HPAI H5N1 infections was
established for mainland China. The risk of HPAI occurrence for
each grid was calculated and classified as the highest risk, high risk,
medium risk and low risk according to quartile levels for predicted
prevalence in the predictive map.
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